Alexey Zabotkin’s press conference speech: All-Russian Survey of Consumer Finance
Good afternoon,
Today, I present the results of the 2024 All-Russian Survey of Consumer Finance. I will provide the initial analysis of the survey. This will certainly be followed by more in-depth research projects analysing the data, and their results will be published. As with the last wave of the survey two years ago, we welcome analysts and researchers to use these data in their papers.
Slide 2
Many central banks conduct this type of survey. The resulting data are unique for several reasons.
First, such surveys investigate households. Many decisions in the economy about consumption or demand for credit are made at the household, rather than individual, level. Therefore, understanding the patterns of these decisions is critical.
Second, such surveys are longitudinal in nature, which means that the same households are tracked in several waves. By measuring changes in one and the same household, researchers secure substantial additional benefits in terms of the scope of questions studied based on these data.
Third, the focus is on the financial and economic aspects of households.
Slide 3
Why do central banks conduct such surveys? As central banks make monetary policy decisions, ensure financial stability and foster financial market development, they need detailed insights into economic life. Household finance surveys provide central banks with information that makes it possible to make a judgement on:
- loan demand and saving factors;
- financial behaviour during economic shocks;
- microlevel financial stability risks;
- monetary policy transmission;
- opportunities and constraints in Russia’s financial market.
Slide 4
As a reminder, such surveys have been held biennially in Russia since 2013. The first four waves of the survey were organised by the Ministry of Finance in conjunction with the World Bank.
The Bank of Russia has organised the survey for the second time, with the sixth round taking place in 2024. Fieldwork was conducted by Demoskop.
The survey was mainly conducted from March to October 2024, with 99% of responses collected from May to July.
A key feature is the re-interviewing of the same households from the previous wave to maintain longitudinal consistency.
Slide 5
Two detailed questionnaires were used: a household questionnaire (182 questions) and an individual questionnaire (384 questions) for adult household members. The topics included income, spending, financial assets and savings, financial obligations, inflation expectations and financial literacy.
Representativeness in some key attributes is the key requirement enabling to scale up the results and conclusions for the general population.
The three slides that follow show that our sample is representative of Russia as a whole. Its characteristics are generally consistent with the sample of Rosstat surveys.
Slide 6
In terms of place of residence of respondents.
Slide 7
In terms of gender and age structure of the population.
Slide 8
In terms of education levels.
Slide 9
Let me now comment on the changes in households’ financial indicators based on the 2024 results relative to 2022. First, as regards income.
Let us analyse the distribution of households surveyed by nominal income per member in 2024. Households are divided into 10 equal decile groups of per capita money income. As a reminder, a decile group is made by ordering the sample by an indicator (income in this case) and dividing it into 10 equal-sized parts. In the distribution chart, these groups are marked with different colours.
We can see that the majority of households are concentrated in the range of 15,000 to 35,000 rubles per person. High-income households are present in our sample too, but their share is small. The wealthiest groups tend to be underrepresented in such surveys because they decline to participate. This is typical of Russia, including Rosstat surveys, as well as other countries.
Slide 10
Here, we show the median values of nominal incomes calculated within decile groups in 2022 and 2024. You will remember that the median is the level of income that divides the group into two equal parts, with one half of workers earning less than this value and the other more. In the slide, we can see that the median of nominal income per household member rises in all the decile groups between the two survey waves.
Slide 11
Real income. We divide all the households into seven groups based on the rate of per capita income growth.
65% of households recorded growth in real per capita income, that is, income adjusted for inflation, from 2022 to 2024. Incomes are up more than 50% a fifth of households. At the same time, about a fifth of households recorded a significant decline in real incomes (10% and less).
Slide 12
The proportion of heads of households perceiving their financial standing as stable increased in 2024 compared to 2022 in all the income growth groups. Households with faster growing incomes also show more substantial growth in the share of heads of households who are confident of their financial stability. In the households with the fastest growing incomes, this share added 11pp.
This may be a risk factor considering that respondents may unreasonably extrapolate their assessment of current financial standing to future periods and thus make misguided decisions with regard to spending, saving and loans.
Slide 13
Key observations on spending. Let us look at the dynamics of household spending between the two waves of the survey. In all the decile income groups, except the wealthiest, median real spending grew less than income over the past two years. Over two years, real spending grew significantly across all the groups (10% to 22%, depending on the income group).
Slide 14
Another trend to note is that the poorest households showed the highest real spending growth between the two waves. The lower the total household spending level in 2022, the higher its growth rates were in 2024.
As the right-hand chart shows, households whose real per capita income increased 50% and more over the two years show the highest growth of spending on durable goods in real terms (57%).
Slide 15
According to the survey, heads of households felt more positive about changes in their financial standing in 2024.
The left-hand chart shows that in 2024, the degree of optimism in subjective assessments of changes in households’ financial standing over the past year was only outperformed in 2013.
Moreover, as can be seen from the right-hand chart, estimates for changes in financial standing were more positive in 2024 than in 2022 in all the decile groups.
Slide 16
Now, let us look at the savings and types of financial assets households have. Importantly, the survey asked people about short-term rather than long-term savings since they understand this better. But, strictly speaking, from the viewpoint of economic terminology, we are talking about long-term savings.
The left-hand chart shows that over the past two years the share of households with savings has increased across all the income groups. However, of the low-income groups, the number of households with savings is few.
The proportion of households saying that their savings have increased over the past year is also up in all the income groups, and most substantially in the more affluent groups. This can be seen from the right-hand chart.
Slide 17
Now on to financial assets. They include households’ savings and funds for current consumption. Cash is traditionally excluded from the analysis, as respondents usually refuse to discuss amounts of cash to hand.
Bank accounts and deposits invariably remain the most popular form of financial assets. Their share even increased slightly.
Other forms of financial assets (shares, bonds, investment fund units and pension savings) are held by a small number of households in our sample, which underrepresents the wealthiest households.
We can see that the median amounts of households’ investment in almost all types of financial assets are up in 2024 relative to 2022. The median value of total financial assets and bank accounts and deposits was up 50%.
The growth in the median amounts of investments in e-wallets, metal-backed accounts, shares and bonds reflects, among other things, reflects the effect of revaluation of these financial assets over the past two years.
Slide 18
Between 2022 and 2024, real financial assets increased in all the decile income groups, as follows from the left-hand chart. It stands out in the
Once all the households are broken down by real money income growth in
Slide 19
Now, let us discuss the financial liabilities of Russian households.
In 2024, the share of households with financial liabilities in our sample was virtually unchanged from 2022 (at 23% in 2022 and 20% in 2024).
The structure of financial liabilities is quite stable. Consumer loans and microloans are the most common form of debt: in 2024, 10% of households had such loans compared to 12% two years ago. The shares of households with mortgage, credit card and car loan liabilities remained level with 2022. The survey recorded a drop in the percentage of households with debt to individuals.
The middle part of the table shows that median debt amounts increased for all types of liabilities.
To ensure better comparability with credit history bureau data and analytical materials based on them, the right part of the table contains average debt indicators by liability type, which were also up over the past two years. In 2024, the average debt indicators exceeded the median more significantly than two years before. This suggests that household liabilities are increasingly dominated by large loans.
Slide 20
Let us analyse demand for loans.
The left-hand chart shows that the percentage of individuals who applied for loans within the two years before the survey was down in all groups differentiated by real income growth.
The share of households that took on new loans to buy real estate (right-hand chart) also decreased in all the groups but in households whose incomes grew the most. This group registered a considerable rise in the demand for mortgage loans.
As a reminder, the survey was for the most part conducted before 1 July 2024, that is when subsidised mortgage loans were available.
Slide 21
In conclusion, I would like to explain how survey data help us explore the characteristics of inflation expectations.
The survey findings confirm the relationship between inflation expectations and the economic situation. The more positive is respondents’ assessment of the economic outlook and their own wealth, the lower their inflation expectations are. In other words, low inflation expectations reflect respondents’ optimism. The same trends are found in inFOM’s regular surveys about inflation expectations and consumer sentiment.
Slide 22
The survey confirmed another correlation: people without savings have higher inflation expectations. Also, people who have a stronger inclination to spend have higher inflation expectations.
Slide 23
Let us see what makes people spend or save.
As is seen in the right-hand chart, those opting to spend their discretionary money, for the most part explain this by high inflation. On the other hand, they note low confidence in the future and low deposit rates. By logical extension, this is due to their high inflation expectations. It is therefore unsurprising to see soaring demand for goods in periods of one-off price hikes. This financial behaviour complicates stabilisation of inflation after one-off price shocks, justifying a tighter monetary policy response to them.
On the other hand, the left side of the figure shows that those preferring to save money have low confidence in the future, that is, they save out of a precautionary motive. The high deposit rates, which rose in the course of the survey, were also an important motive.
Slide 24
Another important area of the household survey was the relationship between financial literacy and inflation expectations. The survey asked 17 questions related to financial literacy. The results show that the higher financial literacy, the lower inflation expectations. It comes as no surprise then that central banks are keen to build financial culture, with the spread of financial knowledge boosting the efficiency of monetary policy.
Slide 25
Before I make conclusions, I would like to highlight an experiment on Russian data, conducted in the course of Wave 6 for the first time, which helped understand which information significantly influences households’ inflation expectations.
Such randomised controlled experiments have become a standard tool in social sciences, where real experiments cannot be performed. The authors of this methodology received the Nobel Prize in economics: Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer in 2019, and Joshua Angrist and Guido Imbens in 2021.
The essence of the experiment was as follows. Respondents were divided into six groups. One (control) group was given no additional information. The remaining five groups were told one of the following types of information: last year’s inflation, the Bank of Russia’s inflation target, the inflation target and the success of achieving it in the pre-pandemic period, inflation expectations according to FOM, and information about the growth of money in the economy. Thereafter, respondents’ inflation expectations were measured.
The causal relationship in the experiment was found by comparing the mean values in the control and treatment groups.
Slide 26
Ultimately, of all the additional types of information provided to participants in the experiment, only the growth of money supply had a significant impact on inflation expectations (more specifically, it contributed to their increase). Respondents proved less sensitive to other information.
Slide 27
In conclusion, let me present the key findings.
Between 2022 and 2024, most Russian households registered growth in real incomes. There was a rise in the share of households confident that their financial standing is stable, especially among households marked by high income growth rates.
Concurrently, household spending increased. Real spending was growing at a slightly lower pace than income, but still fast, in all the decile groups.
The combination of these factors suggests that respondents may over-extrapolate future income changes from the
Slide 28
As incomes increase, we observe not only higher spending, but also a growing number of households with savings. Growth of financial assets was strongest among middle-income households.
The number of indebted households was largely unchanged. The median debt increased in 2024 compared to 2022 in part due to an increased share of households with large loans. Households where 2024 incomes grew substantially have a stronger inclination to take on new mortgage loans.
Slide 29
As for inflation expectations, the lowest are among those households which:
- are more financially literate;
- prefer saving to saving;
- are optimistic about their financial situation.
Growth rates of money supply are important for respondents’ inflation expectations.
Slide 30
You are welcome to explore methodological materials and access data for research on our website in the Research.
Thank you.